Safely at Sea : Our role in creating safety by Teperi, Anna-Maria & Puro, Vuokko
Our role in creating safety
SAFELY AT SEA 
Anna-Maria Teperi  •  Vuokko Puro
T 
    
  S
AFE
LY AT SEA
Our role in creating s
afety
The purpose of this guide is to encourage seafarers and 
maritime operators to develop safety together. The guide 
features ﬁ ndings, lessons learnt and insights yielded by the 
“Assessing and developing maritime safety culture – bet-
ter safety through managing human factors” (SeaSafety) 
research project. 
It is generally acknowledged that the underlying reasons 
for incidents, hazardous occurrences and accidents include 
“weak spots in safety culture” or “a human factor”. What 
does that mean? What is it that did not work in practice? 
This guide makes the often very abstract terms of “human 
factors” and “safety culture” more familiar and easier to 
understand. In general usage, the term “human factors” is 
usually given a negative connotation. This guide brings a 
new angle to terms and introduces a new way to use them: 
Where did we succeed? Why? What did we learn? What cre-
ates safety? In essence, safety is people’s mostly successful 
actions.
A positive approach to safety was a key idea in the SeaSafe-
ty project: we applied tools and models that support safety 
at workplaces in co-operation with diﬀ erent maritime 
operators. Positive safety thinking beneﬁ ts all maritime 
operators: shipping company employees and management, 
authorities, industry experts, trainers, occupational health 
care as well as occupational safety. For instance, bringing 
up incidents openly, handling them in order to learn and 
sharing insights gained and lessons learnt improve aware-
ness of the impact of one’s own actions on safety. 
In co-operation, acting as one system, we can anticipate 
incidents and accidents or mitigate the consequences of 
incidents that have already occurred. The eﬀ ects of distur-
bances and risks remain smaller, they occur less frequently 
and we understand why and how they occur. 
Dear reader, 
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A few words 
about
 the SeaSafety 
project 
 
The SeaSafety project consisted of an initial survey, four workshops, inter-
views, workplace visits, document analysis and a ﬁ nal evaluation. 
The project was driven and kept going by the participants’ passion to learn, 
understand and promote maritime safety. 
The project was carried out jointly by the Finnish Institute of Occupation-
al Health, the three shipping companies TallinkSilja, Bore and Strömma, 
the Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Traﬁ ), the Vessel Traﬃ  c Services of 
the Finnish Transport Agency, the Finnish Passenger Ship Association, the 
Finnish Ministry of Social Aﬀ airs and Health and the Occupational Health 
and Safety division of the Regional State Administrative Agency for South-
ern Finland. The project was funded by the Finnish Work Environment Fund 
and Traﬁ , for which we would like to express our thanks. A research team at 
the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health led and co-ordinated the pro-
ject. The project execution was supported and guided by a steering group 
– A warm thank you to all the group members!
Information about other output and results of the project and the langua-
ge versions of this guide are available at www.ttl.fi /seasafety 
The SeaSafety project group members were Anna-Maria Teperi, Vuokko 
Puro, Päivi Miilunpalo, Pia Perttula, Henriikka Ratilainen, Maria Tiikkaja and 
Maria Sihvola
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There are dozens of deﬁ nitions of safety culture and even 
experts belong to diﬀ erent schools of thought. At its sim-
plest, the point is that we all – including you – create safety 
culture at our workplaces. Safety culture is a company’s way 
of working in safety-related issues – it consists of and is 
inﬂ uenced by everyday practices that ensure and promote 
safety. 
Recently, safety research has highlighted a new approach 
(Hollnagel 2014), aiming at making safety thinking more 
positive and proactive. 
SAFETY I
the traditional approach to
realising and developing safety
Diﬀ erences between the traditional and new approaches (Hollnagel 2014; Reason 2008). 
SAFETY 2
the new approach to realising 
and developing safety
Safety = the risk of unwanted events is as low as 
possible
Reactive approach: safety is developed by elimi-
nating risks, failures, errors and their underlying 
reasons
Focus on factors that impair safety, on “what 
goes wrong” 
People are perceived as sources of errors, risk 
factors or risks 
Safety = as much as possible goes right and is 
successful
Proactive approach: events are identiﬁ ed and 
anticipated
Focus on successes and factors that maintain 
safety
It is accepted that human action always entails 
variance and the prerequisites of action are always 
subject to restrictions, which requires adaptation 
E.g. creating new operating methods, avoiding 
error situations, mitigating consequences, com-
pensating for missing resources and ensuring that 
work goes right
People are perceived as assets (“rescuers”) that 
bring ﬂ exibility, elasticity and tolerance into sys-
tems in constantly changing work situations 
Safety culture
– our way of
working in
safety-related issues   
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Do you recognise
incidents
in your work?
What about things
that go well? ?
At your workplace/on board your ship, are 
people encouraged to report incidents?
If there is anything unclear with regard to the questions 
above, turn to the occupational safety representative, your 
immediate supervisor or other line management, such as 
the ship’s captain. In some situations, occupational health 
care services may be the best party to advance the case, 
either through an appointment, a periodic inspection or a 
workplace survey.
Figure 1 below includes examples of incidents identiﬁ ed in 
the maritime project, representing various levels of serious-
ness. A blank tool template can be found in Appendix 1.
This guide uses the general concept incident to describe all 
deviating and unwanted safety-related situations in sea-
faring. Concepts, such as hazardous occurrence, accident, 
non-conformity, equipment failure and defect, are used but 
they have not become ﬁ rmly established among diﬀ erent 
maritime operators..
For more detailed information on terms, see Appendix 7. 
What kind of (unwanted) events/incidents 
may occur on board during your shift/watch?
You can always learn from what has gone well in work as 
well as from everything that has gone “normally and as 
planned”. Safety can be further developed and existing 
good operating models and methods can be strengthened 
when attention is paid to smoothly running operations and 
successes and they are made visible and analysed more 
closely. 
Identifying diﬀ erent incidents at work and making them 
visible is also necessary in order to improve safety-related 
issues in practice to learn from incidents.  
What kind of things in your work go well?
In which tasks do you usually succeed?
What kind of risks does your work entail when it 
comes to safety?
What kind of minor incidents have you
encountered in your work as a seafarer?
During your career, have you got into more seri-
ous accidents or hazardous occurrences?
Do you know how to submit an incident report?
To whom do you send it?
How is your report processed and where is the 
information located?
Do you get feedback on the report you submit-
ted? How about information about corrective 
actions?
Is it possible that your report threatens your sta-
tus in the work community?
8. 9.
! This tool utilises the classic model used in safety research, known as Heinrich’s ration (Heinrich 1931). The model shows that more minor incidents may occur than medium-severity and serious accidents. In addition, the same reasons or mechanisms of inﬂ uence may be behind minor incidents and more serious incidents.
MEDIUM-SEVERITY INCIDENTS
e.g. problems with navigation equipment,
diﬃ  cult weather conditions, violent clients
MINOR INCIDENTS
e.g. verbal threats, busy traﬃ  c 
SERIOUS 
INCIDENTS
e.g. shifting cargo, 
black out, 
the breaking of a mooring rope
SAFETY SITUATION ANALYSIS 
Figure 1 Examples of incidents in seafaring, representing various levels of severity. 
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The following model/tool helps you to analyse an encoun-
tered incident or disturbance at the workplace and your 
actions in it (Figure 2). With the aid of the model, describe 
what happened before, during and after the situation. Also 
contemplate and write down what you did well and what 
you could have done better in diﬀ erent phases of the chain 
of events. The analysis template in Appendix 3 has more 
space for notes.     
Contemporary safety thinking emphasizes success stories and good practices that help people to handle even dif-
ﬁ cult situations so that they do not become more serious. Consequently, safety does not only consist of identifying 
and calculating risks and errors, but also identifying areas in which performance is good and professional and 
situations are recognised.
Figure 2 
Incident 
analysis
Often, incidents give some kind of warning signals 
before occurring or the personnel has a preconception 
of them on the basis of earlier reports, discussions or 
experience.
Have you found yourself in a situation where you could 
have prevented an incident or mitigated its consequenc-
es by anticipating and rectifying the situation?
”These direct questions are good, 
as is not asking what you did 
wrong but what you could have 
done better. It is a much more 
positive question and makes you 
think about developing things.”   
“Going through successes 
related to incidents was a 
new and good idea.”  ””
 
ENNEN AIKANA Missä toimimme hyvin?
ENNEN TILANNETTA Missä toimimme hyvin?
INCIDENT ANALYSIS
Are you capable of analysing your workplace’s safety incidents and assess your own actions in 
resolving them? Use the chart below to write down a summary of measures to manage safety 
proactively during and after (aftercare) incident situations.  
BEFORE THE SITUATION 
What could we have done better? 
DURING THE SITUATION 
What could we have done better? 
BEFORE THE SITUATION What happened?
AFTER THE SITUATION What happened?
BEFORE THE SITUATION 
What did we do well? 
DURING THE SITUATION 
What did we do well?
DURING THE SITUATION What happened?
AFTER THE SITUATION 
What did we do well?
AFTER THE SITUATION 
What could we have done better? 
How can we
handle and analyse
the incidents? 
!
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How is safety managed proactively at your workplace, both 
during and after incident situations? At your workplace, you 
can use the chart below when contemplating your current 
safety development practices and use the blank chart in 
Appendix 2 to write down a summary of measures to man-
age safety proactively, during and after (aftercare) incident 
situations.  
Figure 3
Examples of practices with which maritime organizations 
manage safety proactively, during and after incident situa-
tions  
Do your supervisor and the shipping company 
management support the handling of
safety-related issues?
Based on the observations of external inspectors, 
is progress made?
Are the instructions concerning your work clear? 
Are they easy to adhere to in your everyday work?
Have safety rules been agreed on? Does everyone 
interpret them consistently?
What kind of a division of tasks do you have 
among the crew when handling diﬀ erent safety 
incidents?
Do you all have suﬃ  cient competence to handle 
situations? In which matters would you like have 
additional guidance or information?
Is the ﬂ ow of information and communications 
with other parties functioning well? 
Do tools function (e.g. usability and functionality 
of two-way radios; do cabin cleaning personnel’s 
radios function? How much strength do the plates 
carried by a waiter during a shift require... )?
Before During the situation After
How is safety managed proactively at our workplace, both during and after in-
cident situations? Use the chart below to write down a summary of measures to 
manage safety proactively during and after (aftercare) incident situations.  
ANALYSIS OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Safety management system
Operations manual 
Risk assessment 
Work permit procedure
Checklists
Crisis management instructions
Training of internal defusing 
counsellors & operating model 
maintenance
Ship pharmacy & health care
Training and situational practices
Maintenance inspections 
Audits & observations 
 
Hierarchy functions well, man-
agement = captain
Instructions card near/on the 
desk
Standard procedure/alert chart
Fireﬁ ghting equipment 
First aid equipment and supplies
Communications and dissemina-
tion of information 
Situation assessment and conclu-
sions 
Incident reporting 
Incident analysis 
Preventive actions (circular, 
changes to the system) 
Crisis support – support discus-
sions with the personnel, agree-
ing on follow-up
Handling in a common meeting 
(+/- feedback to the persons 
concerned) 
Going through the situation to-
gether with other operators  
 
The chart below (Figure 3) lists examples of safety develop-
ment practices identiﬁ ed by maritime organizations. 
What kind of
opportunities do
you have to
participate in the
development of safety?
How does your
workplace handle 
safety-related
issues?
Take a moment to think about your opportunities to 
participate in the development of safety:
14. 15.
Over the past few decades, it has been concluded that 
safety development requires a better understanding 
of people’s actions. You can take a moment to think 
about the following questions related to human factors, 
among other things: 
“The design of the tool has 
succeeded well.”  
“The HF tool makes you 
consider the case comp-
rehensively, all the way 
to conclusions – how to 
move forward.” 
“The tool can be used for analysing 
both accidents and HR issues.” ” ”
”
When are you particularly alert and attentive?
How often do you feel tired at work? According to 
your observations, how has your level of alertness 
aﬀ ected your perception, memory, decision-making 
and work performance? 
Are the tools and equipment you use easy to use?
Do they support your actions? Is it possible that some 
tools interfere with your success in work? 
On board your ship, what kind of decisions do you 
make as a team/group? Are everyone’s views taken 
into account in decision-making?
What kind of decision-making is successful? Why do 
decisions sometimes lead in the wrong direction?
Does your ship or your shipping company support 
the development of matters towards safety? Are safe-
ty-related issues appreciated (or are they considered 
a necessary evil and an expenditure item)?
Do you feel that your workplace learns from earlier 
mistakes? 
Does your organization have the skills and courage to 
deal with error situations after they have occurred or 
are any emerging lessons buried out of sight?
 
Can there be a lack of skills in working or
conﬂ icts in practices?
The aspects described above are examples of so-
called human factors in seafaring. How much is this 
topic discussed at your workplace? Are people aware 
of it?
Human factors 
– the background 
factors that eﬀ ect 
how you succeed 
at your work
16. 17.
Mastering 
dynamic, 
complex
situations
Figure 4
Human factors chart, HF tool.   
The propeller tool (HF tool) on the previous page is a human factors chart that was originally developed for air 
navigation services trainingz, incident reporting and analysis (Teperi et al., 2015). Since then, the tool has been 
modiﬁ ed and tested in rescue services, education, nuclear industry and rail traﬃ  c, among other ﬁ elds (Teperi, 
2016). The tool lends itself to both proactive safety work (a tool for group performance review, management 
review or risk assessment, for instance) and the investigation and analysis of unwanted events.!Which of the factors in the image are now in order on board your ship and which factors support the realisation of safe-ty? (indicate with +). Which of the factors in the image do not really seem to be working well on board your ship? Which would you like to see improved?  (indicate with -) The larger version of the tool can be found in Appendix 4. 
HF TOOL
Competence, mastery of work
Situation awareness (perception, memory, decision-making, response/execution)
Working along instructions and agreed procedures
Understanding the bigger picture/overall situation
Proacting, preconceptions and assuring assumptions
Workload (overload/unload) and means for managing it
Vigilance, alertness, fatigue symptoms
Life situation, anxiety, level of (long-term) stress
Age; quality and quantity of work experience
Health, work ability
Motivation, attitudes
Emotional state and reactions, mood
Individual’s actions and characteristics
1.
2.
3.
4.
5. 
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Work actions, characteristics of work
Quality and contents of work; work demands
Quantity of work; time pressure, having to rush
Work organization, work distribution, job descriptions; 
clarity
Usability and functionality of devices, software, 
technology
Procedures and instructions; functionality, clarity 
and being up-to-date
Opportunities to inﬂ uence one’s work and working 
conditions
Feedback on work, professional appreciation
Opportunity/ability to evaluate and develop one’s work 
processes
Assuring competence (training, exercises, other 
ways of learning)
Work hygiene factors, physical work environment, working 
conditions, occupational hygiene factors (noise, 
ventilation, lighting, temperature; layout)
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Group-level factors
Shared understanding of the situation among all 
group members
Knowledge of all group members is used
Communication within group (e.g. are misunderstan-
dings, misinterpretations and mishearings corrected)
Structure and cohesion of group, group dynamics 
(social relations, atmosphere, mutual support)
Communication between diﬀ erent groups (deck, 
engine room, VTS, pilot, tugboats, icebreakers, 
harbour, other ships); model maritime glossary; 
language skills
Information ﬂ ow, communication practices, incl. 
change of watch, change of shift 
Decision-making in group (e.g. role of the watch 
oﬃ  cer)
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Management and leadership; structure, styles
Organization/safety culture
Co-operation betweeen diﬀ erent organization levels 
and units (e.g. oﬃ  ce, ship, technology, quality and 
safety, manning)
Understanding ship safety as a whole throughout 
the shipping company’s management
Decisions made (incl. resources; personnel, equipment)
Change management (personnel, systems)
Co-operation with partners, e.g. shipping 
companies, authorities
The company’s support for ship operations (SMS/DPA)
Organization-level factors
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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Incident analysis
opens a window
of opportunity for 
learning 
Describe the key phases of the chain of
events as a timeline
What happened before the threatening situation? 
What happened during the situation?
What was done after the situation? 
Indicate on parallel timelines 
a. in the green area, things that went well, functions 
that were handled well and successes in diﬀ erent 
phases of the chain of events described above  
b. in the red area, those phases and issues that could 
have been handled better, that is: operational weak-
nesses and failures in handling the situation
Use the HF tool to identify factors that inﬂ uenced 
the situation 
When the event has been modelled on the timelines, 
related HF tool items are identiﬁ ed and indicated with 
+ and – on the timelines as factors that inﬂ uenced the 
situation (either improved or impaired safety).
Just reporting incidents is not enough. Cases should also 
be analysed and eﬀ orts should be made to learn from 
them. When events are analysed, it is useful for entire work 
communities or groups to discuss which factors inﬂ uenced 
the occurrence of the event, what action was taken in the 
situation, what went well and what should have been done 
diﬀ erently. Supervisors should set an example to oth-
er members of the work community on how discussions 
become open learning forums not focusing on seeking to 
apportion blame. When the factors inﬂ uencing the event 
have been identiﬁ ed, it is easier to ﬁ nd the correct actions 
that improve safety and the operations of the work commu-
nity as a whole. 
Supervisors are also key persons in launching corrective 
actions and persistently pushing forward. Many aspects can 
be developed with own resources, internally by the work 
community. In some situations, it is a good idea to use an 
external expert or sparring partner.   
The earlier introduced human factor “propeller” tool can 
also be used in investigating incidents and learning from 
them, together with the three-part timeline template. A 
blank timeline template can be found in Appendix 4 of 
this guide. On the timeline on the next page, the incident 
analysis is illustrated with a simple example of loading a 
coﬀ eemaker in the evening, to have it ready for the morn-
ing (Figure 5). 
If you would like to test the HF TOOL / propeller
tool in analysing a case (e.g. a case that has
occurred to you previously), proceed according
to the following procedure: 
1
2
3
20. 21.
NN intends to load the coﬀ eemaker in the evening, to have 
it ready for the morning. However, the coﬀ eemaker already 
switches itself on and starts making coﬀ ee in the evening. 
Why? What successes and failures are related to the event? 
Which factors inﬂ uenced NN’s actions in diﬀ erent phases of 
the chain of events?  
As can be seen from the simpliﬁ ed coﬀ eemaker example, 
the chain of events entails several successes (anticipating 
the early wake-up in the morning, loading the coﬀ eemak-
er, reacting to what was heard and saving the situation) as 
well as a failure – accidentally turning the coﬀ eemaker on. 
People’s actions in diﬀ erent phases of the chain of events 
are inﬂ uenced by many diﬀ erent factors mentioned in 
the “propeller” tool introduced above, such as situational 
awareness, anticipation of diﬀ erent situations, level of job
control, adherence to instructions and agreed operating
methods, reacting and alertness. By managing these factors 
that inﬂ uence people’s actions, we can help people to suc-
ceed in diﬀ erent tasks and situations. 
Let’s expand the perspective from the everyday example to 
a classic maritime accident – the capsizing of the car ferry 
Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987. The car ferry left Zee-
brugge harbour with its bow and stern doors open. Soon 
after departure, water began to enter the car deck through 
the open doors and when the ship started turning, the 
water moved to the other side of the ship and the ship cap-
sized. The chain of events leading to the capsizing of the 
car ferry, related successes and failures as well as human 
factors inﬂ uencing the events are described in Figure 6 be-
low. The analysis of events could be expanded to the rescue 
work and accident investigation. 
+2
Perception
-2 Situational awareness
-7 Fatigue
Figure 5 Phases of the chain of events related to loading the coﬀ eemaker and factors inﬂ uencing NN’s actions.  
TIMELINE FOR FAILURES
EVENT TIMELINE 
TIMELINE FOR SUCCESSES 
+2 Situational awareness
+5 Anticipation of diﬀ erent situations
+2
Reacting
TIME
TIME
TIME
Late at night, NN 
remembers the 
early wake-up 
next morning and 
decides to get 
up and load the 
coﬀ eemaker
Measures two 
cups of water 
into the water 
chamber  
 
Folds a paper 
fi lter inside the 
funnel 
Measures 
the required 
amount of 
coﬀ ee into the 
fi lter
Turns the
coﬀ eemaker on 
Notices 
that the 
coﬀ ee-
maker is 
starting 
to boil the 
water
Quickly 
turns oﬀ  
the coﬀ ee-
maker’s 
power 
switch
Leaves the 
coﬀ eemaker 
fully loaded for 
the morning 
 
Accidentally 
turns the cof-
feemaker on im-
mediately after 
loading it, due 
to the process 
having become 
automatic 
AN EXAMPLE OF ANALYSING A CASE WITH THE HF TOOL: 
Anticipates the 
rush caused by the 
early wake-up and 
streamlines the 
morning routine 
 
Hears that 
the coﬀ ee-
maker has 
started 
operating
Reacts 
quickly to 
what he 
hears and 
saves the 
situation
22. 23.
This ship is 
not suitable 
for the 
harbour in 
question. 
 
The captain assumes 
that bow doors are 
closed as he had not 
heard otherwise
The bow doors open 
horizontally so the 
captain cannot see 
their position from 
the bridge. 
As shown by the Herald of Free Enterprise example, descri-
bing the chain of events on three timelines helps to de-
termine its structure. The contemplation of successes and 
things that were handled well brings a new perspective into 
analysing the event and helps to understand the choices 
and decisions made in diﬀ erent phases of the chain of 
events – for instance, the bow was lowered by pumping 
water into the bow ballast tanks so that the ramp would 
reach the upper car deck. The pumping of water solved the 
problem and it was possible to load the cargo into the ship, 
but when water was not completely pumped out and the 
bow was lower than normally, it lead to an accident later. 
Specifying failures and stopping to think about them with 
the aid of the human factors chart helps to gain insight into 
which factors inﬂ uence people’s actions in diﬀ erent phases 
of the chain of events. The assistant boatswain misunders-
tood the boatswain’s reply as permission to go to his cabin 
to rest and slept, perhaps due to his intense fatigue, so 
soundly that he did not wake up to the “Harbour stations” 
call. On the other hand, lack of detailed instructions and 
division of tasks related to closing the doors as well as tool 
deﬁ ciencies contributed to the fact that the doors were not 
closed and the ship’s captain did not notice that they were 
open when he decided on the ship’s departure. Several 
factors contributing to the accident can also be identiﬁ ed 
at the organization level, such as the fact that the shipping 
company did not accept the earlier proposals by the ship 
captains related to the need for sensors that would indicate 
the bow door position and that the entire industry did not 
understand or address the signiﬁ cant risks related to bow 
doors and ro-ro ships.     
TIMELINE FOR FAILURES 
EVENT TIMELINE 
TIMELINE FOR SUCCESSES 
TIME
TIME
TIME
Loading suc-
ceeds in spite 
of a higher tide 
and the excep-
tional loading 
harbour.
The assistant boat-
swain completes 
maintenance work. The 
assistant boatswain 
asks the boatswain’s 
permission to have a 
break.
The boatswain 
notices an excep-
tional situation 
(doors open). 
The captain of anot-
her ship has noticed 
the risk of bow doors 
remaining open and 
has requested a war-
ning light. 
+2 Situational awareness
 +5 Anticipation and 
making sure
+2 Perception +1 Professional
competence 
+34 Communications 
+1 Professional
competence 
+2 Problem-solving 
-23 Usability 
-44 Decisions 
made 
-7 Fatigue
-11 Motivation, 
attitudes
-22 Instructions and 
division of tasks
-23 Usability 
-44 Decisions made 
-31 Making use
of knowledge19.
By analysing factors that inﬂ uence people’s actions, one 
can ﬁ nd development areas and factors to the manage-
ment of which attention should be paid in the future at the 
individual, work, group and organization level. Examples 
of actions to be taken on the basis of the Herald of Free 
Enterprise accident include the clariﬁ cation of the division 
of tasks and instructions as well as the installation of a 
warning light or camera on the bridge to indicate the bow 
door position. 
The HF tool brings a new perspective and helps people 
to learn from incidents or accidents, but in line with new 
safety thinking, it can also be used for analysing successes 
or normal operations. This is the direction in which safety 
thinking should be developed.
Figure 6 Events leading to the capsizing of the car ferry and factors that inﬂ uenced them. 
AN EXAMPLE OF ANALYSING A CASE WITH THE HF TOOL: 
The tide is 
not taken 
into
account in 
the
harbour. 
Water is not 
completely 
pumped out of 
the tanks. 
The assistant boatswain 
assumes that he had got per-
mission to go to his cabin for 
a break when he announced 
the completion of maintenance 
work and the boatswain replied: 
“That will do.”
 
The boatswain 
does not take
action regarding 
the open doors as 
it is not his duty. 
The chief mate
assumes that the 
assistant boatswain 
had gone to the door 
control panel and 
heads for the bridge 
himself. 
The assistant 
boatswain does 
not wake up to the 
“Harbour stations” 
call. 
The ship 
type is 
unstable 
by nature. 
The ship 
is on an ex-
ceptional 
route;
only 1 
ramp in 
Zeebrugge. 
Water in the ballast 
tanks was not 
pumped out before 
departure -> the 
bow of the ship is 
about one metre 
lower than normal. 
 
The boatswain is 
the last to leave 
the car deck and 
notices the open 
doors, but does not 
close them as it is 
not his duty. 
The ship leaves the 
harbour with bow 
and stern doors 
open.
19:05
When the ship starts 
turning,the water 
moves to the other 
side of the ship and 
the ship capsizes.
 the other side of 
the ship and the 
ship capsizes. 19:25
The tide is higher 
than usual. The 
bow was lowered 
by pumping water 
into the bow ballast 
tanks so that the 
ramp would reach 
the upper car deck.
 
The assistant boat-
swain responsible 
for closing the bow 
doors completes his 
maintenance work, 
returns to his cabin 
for a break and falls 
asleep.  
Oﬃ  cially, the chief 
mate is responsible 
for closing the doors 
but according to 
regulations, the chief 
mate must be on the 
bridge 15 minutes 
before departure. 
Water begins to 
enter the car deck 
at 200 tonnes per 
minute when the 
ship’s speed increas-
es, with bow doors 
open and the bow 
lower than normal.
-2 Situational 
awareness
 
-32 Misunderstanding
-34 Communications
-5 Assumptions 
-23
Functionality 
-44 Decisions made
The bow doors of the ship are not closed 
24. 25.
ColleagueSupport 
(Mental First Aid)
ensures work ability 
and functional
capacity after
an incident 
Is it possible that there are feelings of guilt at your 
workplace after a safety incident? Is it possible that a 
hazardous occurrence shocks or frightens people or that 
the personnel have other symptoms or sensations after 
the event?  Would support from a colleague and a quick 
defusing be needed? 
A discussion being carried out within ColleagueSupport 
is mental colleague-to-colleague fi rst aid*. Its goal is to 
normalise potential symptoms and reactions after the 
incident and preserve the work ability and functional 
capacity of persons involved. It is like a “mental sticking 
plaster” for an employee who has encountered an inci-
dent. The discussion is held as soon as possible (within 
8–12 hours) after the incident. 
* Look ﬁ gure 7.
It is important that all SAFER* phases are covered in the 
ColleagueSupport discussion. The discussion is started by 
ensuring that the setting and the situation are peaceful. It is 
important that the person involved in an incident is allowed 
to talk about the incident freely in his or her own words and 
let out emotions and feelings evoked by the incident. The 
ColleagueSupport provider should enter information into 
the situation and normalise it as well as highlight the fact 
that emotions, reactions and symptoms resulting from the 
incident are completely normal, even if the situation itself 
were entirely exceptional and atypical.
As an aid, the symptom table in Appendices can be used: it 
contains four types of symptoms that may occur after an in-
cident (adapted from Mitchell 2006). It can also be discussed 
whether even a shocking event could oﬀ er an opportunity 
to learn something for the future. At the last phase of the 
ColleagueSupport discussion, the person involved in the 
incident is reassured and encouraged and his or her recov-
ery is ensured; the participants assess jointly whether the 
situation allows the person to continue working or to go 
home without further assistance. It is also important to say 
that the person can contact the support person again or 
to indicate where he or she can get help, if necessary, or to 
promise to call the next day to see how he or she is doing, 
for instance.  
The mental ﬁ rst aid procedure (defusing) diﬀ ers from the 
process conducted by professionals, such as occupational 
health care services, (usually called debrieﬁ ng) in that it is 
colleague-to-colleague support: The personnel of the work 
community are trained to become support persons (peers) 
who have the competence to handle minor or medium-se-
verity incidents in the work community. Serious incidents 
should still be handled by occupational health services or 
other external professionals. The mental ﬁ rst aid procedure 
has yielded encouraging results in the pilot project by the 
City of Helsinki (more information about the Hetipurku pilot 
project can be found via the link provided in the list of refer-
ences).
“It is fairly easy to implement,
it is quite a light tool.” 
””“Simple, easy to learn.” !
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Kuva 7. Henkisen ensiavun keskustelumalli (Kollegatuki).
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Figure 7
Mental fi rst aid discussion model 
(ColleagueSupport). 
Restore independent function 
“Are you in a state that will allow you to return home/to work?”
“How will you go on from here?” 
“Have some sleep now and I can call you tomorrow.” 
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Stabilize the situation
“Let’s move over there, shall we?”
“Would you like some water?”
Acknowledge
“What happened?” 
“What did you think?”
Facilitate understanding 
“How did you feel?”
“How did you react?
”Did you get any symptoms?”
“I can only imagine.”
“I would feel like that, too.” 
Encourage adaptive coping, normalise
“This may occur, you may feel like that now.”
“Those reactions are normal” (symptom list)
“Could we learn anything from this?” 
“Remember to avoid drinking alcohol – go for a walk instead.”
At your workplace, discuss together the needs for 
developing safety and plan and choose concrete 
actions to promote safety. You can inspire discus-
sion by approaching the topic with the aid of the 
following questions, among other things. In order to 
achieve genuine development, it is important to en-
sure the prerequisites for implementing the action 
and adequate decision-making power (questions 3 
and 5) and also to agree on the persons in charge, 
the implementation schedule and the follow-up of 
the realisation (questions 6-9).
(adapted, Teperi & Leppänen, 2010: From crisis to development)
Our ship’s future
development
plans
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Which safety-related issues are already handled 
well at your workplace/on board your ship? 
What things have gone well at your shipping 
company?
Which issues that aﬀ ect safety should be ad-
dressed next at your workplace?
Choose 1–3 issues.
What concrete actions should be taken?
Could their implementation have harmful eﬀ ects? 
What does their implementation require from 
you personally and from the entire work
community?
How does advancing the above-mentioned 
issues beneﬁ t you and your work community?
Who decides on advancing the above-mentioned 
issues? To whom or to which party the issues 
should be taken to have them handled or
approved?
Who will be responsible for implementing 
them? Who implements the actions to be taken? 
Appoint a person in charge.
How will you arrange the follow-up of the
realisation? Agree on a person or party in 
charge of the follow-up.
When will you handle the issue next time?
Which is your target schedule for the realisation?
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MEDIUM-SEVERITY INCIDENTS
MINOR INCIDENTS
SERIOUS
INCIDENTS
What kind of safety incidents occur in everyday work at your workplace? Identify typical incidents and write 
them down in the pyramid below. 
APPENDIX 1. SAFETY SITUATION ANALYSIS
Before During the situation After
(write) (write) (write)
How is safety managed proactively at our workplace, and both during and after incident situations? Use the 
chart below to write down a summary of measures to manage safety proactively during and after (aftercare) 
incident situations.  
APPENDIX 2 ANALYSIS OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
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 APPENDIX 3. INCIDENT ANALYSIS 
Are you capable of analysing your workplace’s safety incidents and assess your own actions in resolving them? 
Describe, phase by phase, what happened (before, during and after the situation) and then describe
your actions. 
ENNEN AIKANA Missä toimimme hyvin?
BEFORE THE SITUATION What did we do well?
DURING THE SITUATION What could we have done better? 
BEFORE THE SITUATION What happened?
AFTER THE SITUATION What happened?
ENNEN TILANNETTA Missä toimimme hyvin?BEFORE THE SITUATION What did we do well?
DURING THE SITUATION What did we do well?
DURING THE SITUATION What happened?
AFTER THE SITUATION What did we do well? AFTER THE SITUATION What could we have done better? 
APPENDIX 4. HUMAN FACTORS CHART – HF TOOL  
Mastering 
dynamic, 
complex
situations
Competence, mastery of work
Situation awareness (perception, memory, decision-making, response/execution)
Working along instructions and agreed procedures
Understanding the bigger picture/overall situation
Proacting, preconceptions and assuring assumptions
Workload (overload/unload) and means for managing it
Vigilance, alertness, fatigue symptoms
Life situation, anxiety, level of (long-term) stress
Age; quality and quantity of work experience
Health, work ability
Motivation, attitudes
Emotional state and reactions, mood
Individual’s actions and characteristics
1.
2.
3.
4.
5. 
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Work actions, characteristics of work
Quality and contents of work; work demands
Quantity of work; time pressure, having to rush
Work organization, work distribution, job descriptions; 
clarity
Usability and functionality of devices, software, 
technology
Procedures and instructions; functionality, clarity 
and being up-to-date
Opportunities to inﬂ uence one’s work and working 
conditions
Feedback on work, professional appreciation
Opportunity/ability to evaluate and develop one’s work 
processes
Assuring competence (training, exercises, other 
ways of learning)
Work hygiene factors, physical work environment, working 
conditions, occupational hygiene factors (noise, 
ventilation, lighting, temperature; layout)
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Group-level factors
Shared understanding of the situation among all 
group members
Knowledge of all group members is used
Communication within group (e.g. are misunderstan-
dings, misinterpretations and mishearings corrected)
Structure and cohesion of group, group dynamics 
(social relations, atmosphere, mutual support)
Communication between diﬀ erent groups (deck, 
engine room, VTS, pilot, tugboats, icebreakers, 
harbour, other ships); model maritime glossary; 
language skills
Information ﬂ ow, communication practices, incl. 
change of watch, change of shift 
Decision-making in group (e.g. role of the watch 
oﬃ  cer)
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Management and leadership; structure, styles
Organization/safety culture
Co-operation betweeen diﬀ erent organization levels 
and units (e.g. oﬃ  ce, ship, technology, quality and 
safety, manning)
Understanding ship safety as a whole throughout 
the shipping company’s management
Decisions made (incl. resources; personnel, equipment)
Change management (personnel, systems)
Co-operation with partners, e.g. shipping 
companies, authorities
The company’s support for ship operations (SMS/DPA)
Organization-level factors
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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APPENDIX 6. MENTAL FIRST AID DISCUSSION MODEL (COLLEAGUESUPPORT)  
(adapted on the basis of Jeﬀ rey Mitchell 2006,
59-60 mukaan)
APPENDIX 5.   
TIME
TIME
TIME
(Adapted from Mitchell, J. 2006; Leon-
hardt & Vogt, 2008; Teperi et al. 2016)
Physical symptoms  Cognitive symptoms Emotional symptoms  Behavioural symptoms
sweating concentration problems emotional shock excessive use of alcohol; medicines, other intoxicants
rapid breathing weakened perception ability hate, fear, sorrow unsocial behaviour
palpitations memory problems depression, helplessness overreaction to surroundings
sleep disorders confusion mood swings withdrawal, avoidance 
muscle cramps nightmares guilt inability to rest, anxiety, restless-ness
physical sensations pervasive ideas, memories and thoughts insecurity
Issues that come up in
ColleagueSupport (Mental First 
Aid) conversations are always 
treated conﬁ dentially. 
Stabilize the situation
“Let’s move over there, shall we?”
“Would you like some water?”
Acknowledge
“What happened?” 
“What did you think?”
Facilitate understanding 
“How did you feel?”
“How did you react?
“Did you get any symptoms?”
“I can only imagine.”
“I would feel like that, too.” 
Encourage adaptive coping, normalise
“This may occur, you may feel
like that now.”
“Those reactions are normal”
(symptom list)
“Could we learn anything from this?” 
“Remember to avoid drinking alcohol
– go for a walk instead.”
Restore independent function 
“Are you in a state that will allow you to 
return home/to work?”
“How will you go on from here?” 
“Have some sleep now and I can call you 
tomorrow.” 
Kuva 7. Henkisen ensiavun keskustelumalli (Kollegatuki).
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Four kinds of symptoms may appear
TIMELINE FOR FAILURES
EVENT TIMELINE
 
TIMELINE FOR SUCCESSES 
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APPENDIX 7. INCIDENT-RELATED CONCEPTS AND THEIR DEFINITIONS    
Non-conformity  
= a situation in which objective 
evidence shows that one of ISM 
Code requirements is not met.
INCIDENT REPORTING 
= operating methods that cover the reporting 
and analysis of the non-conformities,
accidents and hazardous occurrences 
mentioned in Section 9 of the ISM Code.
Hazardous occurrence  
= a chain of events that could 
have led to a loss or damage, 
such as injury, environmental 
damage or business loss. 
Accident  
= an event or a series of events 
that leads to injury or material 
or environmental damage.   
Near miss case 
can be used as a
synonym for hazardous 
occurrence.
In addition, shipping companies have other terms that have become established, such as defect and deviation. 
The VTS incident reporting system has three diﬀ erent levels: internal reports, reports on the violation of International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and incident reports.   
The deﬁ nitions of terms used in this guide (Lappalainen 2016)
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It is generally acknowledged that the underlying reasons for incidents, 
hazardous occurrences and accidents include “weak spots in safety culture” 
or “a human factor”. What does that mean? What is it that did not work 
in practice? This guide makes the often very abstract terms of “human 
factors” and “safety culture” more familiar and easier to understand. In 
general usage, the term “human factors” is usually given a negative con-
notation. This guide brings a new angle to terms and introduces a new way 
to use them: Where did we succeed? Why? What could have gone better? 
What creates safety? In essence, safety is people’s successful actions.
Together, acting as one system, we can anticipate incidents and accidents or 
mitigate the consequences of incidents that have already occurred. Dis-
turbances and risks remain less serious, they occur less frequently and we 
understand why and how they occur. 
The purpose of the guide is to encourage seafarers and maritime operators 
to develop safety together. The guide features findings, lessons learnt and 
insights yielded by the “Assessing and developing maritime safety cultu-
re – better safety through managing human factors” (SeaSafety) project. 
The guide also includes the safety development tools and models that were 
used and developed further at the SeaSafety project workshops.  
We hope the guide helps to generate new ideas and inspires discussion at 
work and in the mess. 
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